Download PDF Flesh and Steel During the Great War The Transformation of the French Army and the Invention of Modern Warfare Michel Goya Andrew Uffindell Hew Strachan 9781473886964 Books

Product details Hardcover 344 pages Publisher Pen and Sword Military (December 21, 2018) Language English ISBN-10 1473886961

Flesh and Steel During the Great War The Transformation of the French Army and the Invention of Modern Warfare Michel Goya Andrew Uffindell Hew Strachan 9781473886964 Books Reviews

• I normally avoid Pen and Sword because of their uneven (some great books and some not so great) quality and tendency to limit their publications to 256 pages. In this instance, I am glad to report that Pen and Sword has published an exceptional book in terms of quality, editing, translation, and organization. Even better, the 256 page ceiling has been discarded for the worthy cause of explaining (in the detail necessary to do justice to a little understood topic) how the French Army evolved between 1914 and 1918.
  
  Is this an important book? I think so. British historians have dominated English language accounts of the Western Front during World War One. With a few exceptions, this holds true for both the French and German armies. This is not to say that their work is slanted or inadequate, but they lack the native language abilities and professional skills possessed by the author - former Marine Infantry colonel Michel Goya of the French Army. Goya not only has the requisite academic background, but also exhibits a talented writing style complemented by an intimate knowledge of military campaigning that informs his analytical abilities. By focusing on the evolution of doctrine, technology and organization with the French Army - with forays onto the battlefield to examine how that evolution translated into practical results - Goya complements previously published works on the subject (which are relatively few in number).
  
  The narrative begins by examining the French Army in the wake of its defeat in the 1870 - 71 conflict against Prussia. That experience forms the foundation for its subsequent but ultimately dysfunctional efforts to reform that begin to go awry as combat veterans are replaced one by one during subsequent decades by generals who are more familiar with theory rather than first hand experience in combat against another European army. The lessons of the Boer War and Russo-Japanese war are absorbed but discarded over time as a result of pressure exerted by theorists dominating the senior ranks of the French military. As a result, the cult of the offensive grips both the French infantry and cavalry communities. The field artillery community, however, is not as dogmatically afflicted although it is not aware of the need to coordinate with the infantry nor does it possess far fewer medium and heavy guns in comparison to the Germans.
  
  The book is organized with eleven chapters - most of which are approximately 30 pages in length - entitled thusly Chapter 1 - The Masterminds of La Revanche, Chapter 2 - In Search of a Doctrine, Chapter 3 - The Flaws in the Learning Process, Chapter 4 - The Choice of Arms, Chapter 5 - The Test of Fire, Chapter 6 - The Pressure of the Front, Chapter 7 - GHQ and Tactical Change, Chapter 8 - Confronting the Trenches, Chapter 9 - In the Death Zone, Chapter 10 - The Steel Fist, and Chapter 11 - The Grand Army of 1918. None of the chapters delve extensively into particular battles and campaigns, but they are mentioned as warranted.
  The narrative (in most chapters) progresses from top (GHQ and ministerial level) to bottom (frontline units) in roughly chronological fashion. The huge casualties, wholesale relief of inadequate generals, and the obvious failings of the "cult of the offensive" combine to jump start massive internal reforms. Goya details how the GHQ solicited reports from regiments and divisions that successfully adopted new tactics in response to unexpected battlefield events during the first months of the conflict in order to rapidly disseminate new methods throughout the French Army. These GHQ reports did not spark or accelerate the process of change, but they certainly did not inhibit or interfere with what Goya contends is a bottom up process.
  
  The narrative then progresses through 1915 where Goya notes that GHQ efforts to regain the strategic initiative through a series of large scale attacks that failed due to a combination of the lingering effects of "the cult of the offensive" and fire support that proved sadly inadequate on a battlefield dominated by field fortifications. The failed attacks produced hundreds of thousands of casualties, which when added to the equally tremendous losses of the previous year, virtually gutted the French infantry. However, as the author notes, the field artillery did not suffer comparable losses which allowed it to begin developing sophisticated tactics and improve coordination with supported infantry. As a result, field artillery assumed a unexpected role on the battlefield but successfully rose to the challenge as wartime stresses persuaded military bureaucrats to grant far more resources and intellectual/doctrinal freedom to innovators (which there were many) within the French Army.
  
  Goya contends that 1917 and 1918 offered as many challenges to the French Army as the period 1914 - 1916. Although the French suffered far fewer casualties in comparison to the first several years of the war, they were presented with a succession of battlefield challenges that called for significant changes to doctrine, organization and technology. These included resuming the offensive with limited attacks in 1917 followed by the need to develop mobile defensive tactics in the face of repeated German offensives during the first half of 1918 which transformed into the far different challenge of reintroducing mobile offensive operations during the second half of 1918. Particularly instructive during the last named discussion is Goya's account of how one French infantry division steeped in trench warfare tactics reacted to how German infiltration assault methods forcibly reintroduced mobility on the battlefield beginning in March 1918.
  
  Goya delves deeply in the development of the French aviation and armored forces, as well as adoption of motorization - which somewhat surprisingly took place in large part because so many horses died in 1914 and 1915. The French Cavalry, somewhat inadvertently, figured prominently in these developments. Cavalry regiments were some of the first maneuver units to be motorized and mechanized, albeit largely by default, because they turned over their horses to artillery units. French cavalry officers and NCOs filled the ranks of the newly created armor and aviation branches because GHQ proactively tapped into the manpower reservoir that cavalry divisions represented rather than allow them to remain uncommitted.
  
  Goya consistently surprises and informs his readers with examples too numerous to mention. One example being his convincing assertion that the development of motorized heavy artillery and modern fire control methods by the French had as significant but far more sustained impact during the last year of the war as the German use of storm troop tactics because it allowed the allies to assemble firepower in a mere fraction of the time required earlier. This compressed the interval between major offensives to the point where the Allies launched major assaults in the August - October timeframe with an unprecedented regularity that shook the organizational integrity of the German Army to its very core.
  
  Highly recommended and a must have acquisition for those readers genuinely interested in World War One.